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Abstract  
In this paper we develop an information distortion model (IDM) of social class differences in 
self-beliefs and values. The IDM combines psychological biases on frame-of-reference effects 
with sociological foci on ability stratification. This combination is hypothesized to lead to 
working class children having more positive math self-beliefs and values than equally able 
salariat children. We further suggest that the same conditions that give rise to the working 
class benefit in self-beliefs and values are associated with signaling effects, which suppress 
educational aspirations and attainment. These hypotheses are tested in one cross-sectional 
multi-national and one longitudinal study. The results in favor of the IDM challenge cultural 
models of social class differences and have implications for rational action theory. 
 
Educational Impact And Implications Statement 
Working class children have higher academic self-concept and task value than equally able, 
more advantaged, peers in school systems that are stratified by academic ability. However, 
our cross-national and longitudinal research shows that this advantage does not appear to 
translate into higher aspirations or attainment. We suggests that the very educational 
structures that give rise to self-concept and task value advantage for poorer children 
simultaneously restrict the possibility of their using this advantage to their benefit in terms of 
educational attainment.  
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Introduction 
There are large gaps in educational achievement, aspirations and attainment by social 
class that have proven extremely resistant to change (Anders & Micklewright, 2015; Breen, 
Luijkx, Müller, & Pollak, 2009; Jerrim, Chmielewski, & Parker, 2015; Nash, 2003; OECD, 
2011; Reardon, 2011; Van de Werfhorst & Hofstede, 2007). Importantly, gaps in 
achievement are present at the beginning of schooling and tend to persist or get even larger 
over the course of schooling (Carneiro & Heckman, 2003; Heckman, 2006). Nevertheless, it 
is now clear that differences in academic achievement explain only about half the effect of 
social class on aspirations (Parker, Jerrim, Schoon, & Marsh, 2016) and attainment (Jackson, 
2013). As such there has been an increasingly interdisciplinary focus on factors other than 
academic achievement or ability (or secondary effects in the theoretical framework of 
Boudon, 1974) as both an explanation for and focus of intervention for closing gaps in 
outcomes for children from different social backgrounds (Brunello & Schlotter, 2011; 
Heckman, 2000). This focus has been on what factors predict educational and occupational 
attainment, and differentiate children from different social classes, for children with similar 
levels of academic ability. A great deal of focus has been on what Maaz, Trautwein, Lüdtke, 
and Baumert (2008) suggest are the most important secondary effect mechanisms: academic 
self-beliefs and task values. This is a sensible choice as considerable research has shown the 
consistent positive effect of academic self-beliefs and values, particularly those related to 
math, on various attainment outcomes in university (Guo et al., 2015a, 2015b, 2015c; Marsh, 
1991; Parker et al., 2012, 2014a, 2014b) and occupations (Davis, 1966; Marsh, 1991). In the 
current research we focus on these self-belief and task value factors in the math domain. 
In this paper we claim that there is no universal deficit in academic self-beliefs and 
values for children from less advantaged backgrounds once academic achievement has been 
taken into account. Rather, such children may have even higher levels depending on the 
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structure of the educational system and the relative importance of school selection. In 
particular, we hypothesize that educational systems that are tracked, decentralized, private or 
privatized (e.g., charter or free schools), and/or otherwise stratified by achievement provide 
working class students with a distorted frame-of-reference that may actually promote higher 
levels of some self-beliefs and task values than those of their equally able salariat peers (i.e., 
children of salaried rather than wage earning individuals). Using a series of counterfactual 
models, we further suggest that, while these factors are associated with educational and 
occupational attainment in numerous studies, they are relatively poor explanatory variables 
for social class differences in educational expectations and outcomes. Indeed, while our 
theory indicates that children from working class backgrounds should have higher academic 
self-beliefs and values in stratified systems, these are also systems in which disadvantaged 
children are likely to be furthest behind in terms of aspirations and attainment (Parker et al., 
2016). Thus, educational systems that provide contexts for working class children to have 
more positive self-beliefs and values do not translate those advantages into more equitable 
educational outcomes. We argue that the reason for this is that the same context that gives 
rise to systematic differences by social class in academic self-beliefs and values (i.e., school 
selection and stratification) also has strong counteracting signaling influences that shape 
aspirations and attainment. 
Secondary Effects 
Led largely by the research of Heckman (2000), there is a revolutionary focus in 
educational policy on the influence of factors other than academic ability and achievement on 
educational and occupational outcomes. Economists, sociologists, and psychologists have 
taken on this program with gusto. While this multidisciplinary endeavor has been fruitful, it 
has exposed different theoretical orientations in how social class differences in children of 
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equal ability emerge. Below we review models that hypothesize cultural differences and 
those that focus on different contexts and constraints at the point of educational transitions. 
Cultural Models. Cultural models suggest that social class differences reflect cultural 
differences in perceptions of the value of education and the way in which positive self-beliefs 
are encouraged and promoted. For example, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) suggest that 
working class children perceive real social risks in valuing education too highly. Likewise, 
Lareau (2003) and Gambetta (2009) suggest that there are distinct orientations to education 
that define working class versus salariat families. Such models tend to focus on differences in 
the way education is valued, and indicate that children from working class families tend to 
have less positive self-beliefs in relation to the academic domain (Sullivan, 2006). Thus, 
cultural differences not only shape the way education is valued, but also the way in which 
self-beliefs are constructed and encouraged (Akerlof & Kranton, 2010).  
Behind these theories is the assumption that peer effects take the form of assimilation 
(i.e. the values and self-beliefs of children conform to those of their peers in the same social 
class). Akerlof (1997) uses the metaphor of gravity to suggest that smaller social distance 
between individuals and peers in the same social class (rather than between social classes) 
leads to conformity in peer expectations. This can lead to bright working class children 
holding lower self-beliefs than they should and some less gifted salariat children holding self-
beliefs that are too ambitious. Akerlof posits a standard economic model of education where 
an individual pursues a level of education up to the point when the marginal benefits of more 
education matches the marginal costs; however, he adds to this an interpretation of costs that 
includes social elements.  
Rational Action Theory. Alternative to the cultural differences models are the 
rational action theory models of Goldthorpe and colleagues (e.g., Breen and Goldthorpe, 
1997; Goldthorpe, 2007). The Breen and Goldthorpe (1997; hereafter BG model) model 
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represents one of the most important attempts at integrating long established traditions in 
both sociology and economics to provide a rational action theory of educational and 
occupational attainment. The BG model rejects the suggestion that different social classes 
value education differently or that social class warps the construction of academic self-
beliefs. In response to the cultural model of Akerlof, Goldthorpe (2007) suggests that social 
class subcultures do not have “the coherence or normative force that [Akerlof’s] position 
would require” (p.78). A cultural model assumes that parents from salariat backgrounds are 
better able to instill the value of education or promote positive self-beliefs. Goldthorpe states 
that this position is ill-equipped to explain two clear features of historical changes in 
education: 1) absolute educational expansion, where a greater proportion of the population 
from all social classes have entered university; and 2) despite this expansion, the relative 
distance between social classes in educational attainment has remained comparatively stable 
(Goldthorpe, 2007).  
In contrast to cultural models, the BG model focuses on different “opportunities and 
constraints, and thus the evaluation of different sets of probable costs and benefits” 
(Goldthorpe, 2007, p. 32). Embedded in this model is the assumption that, on average, 
children from all backgrounds value education equally and their self-beliefs are, thus, 
responsive only to their academic performance rather than cultural norms. Goldthorpe 
suggests that the processes that link achievement and expectations to educational outcomes 
are the same for everyone but that children from working class backgrounds face greater risks 
in pursuing more ambitious choices during educational transition. Thus, they require larger 
amounts of cognitive skill and/or more resources (e.g., economic resources that cover the 
direct and indirect costs of education) than their advantaged peers. By implication, the 
threshold at which a working class child will attend university is hypothesized to be higher 
than that of a richer child of equivalent ability. This double disadvantage (i.e. having fewer 
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resources but requiring a higher level of such resources to make an ambitious educational 
choice) is sufficient to explain social class differences without resorting to cultural 
differences in values or warping of academic self-beliefs by social class.  
In detail, the theory suggests that, when considering further education, young people 
have two competing goals: 1) obtaining a social class position at least as prominent as their 
parents (status maintenance); and 2) maximizing their social class position (status 
maximization). Assumptions in the BG model are that: a) status maintenance and 
maximization are often in conflict, and particularly so for working class children; b) when in 
conflict, children will preference status maintenance over status maximization in a process 
referred to as relative risk aversion; c) due to lower levels of academic ability on average, 
children from working class backgrounds will have lower academic self-beliefs; and d) a 
young person’s self-beliefs and level of resources (including financial) are used to evaluate 
whether the risks of status maximization are manageable. To place this in context, suppose a 
child is choosing between going to university and taking an apprenticeship. From a BG 
model perspective, this choice has very little conflict for a child from a salariat background as 
a university degree is increasingly a basic requirement for status maintenance for such 
children. In addition, they have more resources and, on average, higher academic 
achievement and, thus, higher self-belief. For a child from a working class background, who 
has fewer resources and, on average, lower academic ability, the choice is more risky as an 
apprenticeship may ensure status maintenance while attending university is risky where non-
completion is a realistic concern. Thus, such a child has both fewer resources to draw on and 
more to gain from making a less ambitious choice. 
Information Distortion Model. We are in general agreement with the BG model in 
relation to a) relative risk aversion, lower resources, and self-beliefs being the primary drivers 
of differences in social class (though we suggest school signaling effects may help explain 
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country-to-country variation; see below), and b) that in a completely non-stratified education 
system there are unlikely to be meaningful social class differences in academic self-beliefs or 
values beyond that which can be explained by academic achievement. Likewise, our view 
that individuals value domains they feel competent in and self-beliefs of competence depend 
upon the information one receives about one’s position relative to one’s peers is not 
inconsistent with the BG models. Indeed we only diverge from the BG model in one, crucial, 
aspect. Like the BG model, we view a child’s academic self-beliefs (𝜋𝜋 in the BG model [see 
below]; Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997, p. 279) as central to the educational decision-making 
processes. The BG model assumes 𝜋𝜋 does not vary as a function of social class, once 
conditioned on academic achievement. Our perspective is that this depends on the 
information input used to form 𝜋𝜋 and whether the educational system in place leads to 
systematic variance by social class in that information. Thus, the only alteration we make to 
the BG model (p. 285) is to the equation:  
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 =  𝑔𝑔(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ) 
where 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 is academic self-belief, which is the production of some function, g, on the 
academic ability, 𝑎𝑎 , for individual i. 
Rather, we claim that than an individual’s simple level of achievement, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 , best 
represents relative achievement within a given frame-of-reference, specifically within an 
individual’s school. As such, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 is a product of: 
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + (𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 ×  𝜇𝜇)  
where 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 is an individual’s underlying academic achievement (this is well known to vary by 
social class [see Heckman, 2006] and is well integrated into the BG model); 𝜇𝜇  takes only 
positive values and is the degree to which a country stratifies students by ability; and  𝜓𝜓 
represents school selection effects for individual i such that: 
𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖) − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑂𝑂𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖)  
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where 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖) is the probability that child i is undermatched (i.e. in a school where the 
school average achievement is lower than the individual’s achievement) and 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑂𝑂𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖) is the 
probability that child i is overmatched (i.e. in a school where school average achievement is 
higher than the individual’s achievement and the complement of 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖), meaning these 
probabilities must sum to one). If both probabilities are equal for all individuals then 𝜓𝜓 = 0 
and no selection effects are present. Thus, 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 ×  𝜇𝜇 represents a correction to 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 due to school 
placement and the structure of the educational system. 
There are several critical implications of this model. First, it is clear that systematic 
social class bias in the direction of 𝜓𝜓 will lead to systematic differences in 𝜋𝜋 by social class, 
provided that 𝜇𝜇 is non-zero. Indeed, there is now clear evidence that salariat children tend to 
be in schools in which there is an overmatch between the ability of the child and that of the 
school, while, due to choice constraints, the opposite is true for working class children 
(Jerrim, Parker, Chmielewski, & Anders, 2016; Maaz et al., 2006). As such, on average, 
𝜓𝜓𝑤𝑤 > 0 for working class children and 𝜓𝜓𝑠𝑠 < 0 for salariat children. Second, in countries in 
which no stratification occurs (i.e., 𝜇𝜇 = 0), absolute ability will equal relative ability 
regardless of the degree of school selection effects and thus the formula for 𝜋𝜋 will revert to 
that reported in Breen and Goldthorpe (1997). Finally, as with the BG model, our model 
explicitly rejects additional social class influences that would be consistent with a cultural 
difference model. As such, social class differences on 𝜋𝜋 conditioned for 𝛾𝛾 will either be zero 
(𝜇𝜇 = 0 or 𝜓𝜓 = 0), as implied by the BG model, or in favor of working class children (given 
𝜓𝜓𝑤𝑤 > 0 and 𝜓𝜓𝑠𝑠 < 0). Importantly, we explicitly exclude an additional parameter in the 
equation for 𝜋𝜋 that implies class assimilation effects and thus we do not expect there to be 
circumstances under which able working class children hold, on average, more negative self-
beliefs or values compared to their equally able salariat peers. We unpack these implications 
below. 
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The formation of self-beliefs and values 
While there are a number of theories on the development of academic self-beliefs, a 
common set of processes have been implicated within empirical research (Marsh, 2006). 
These are that a) children tend to feel competent in areas in which they get better over time 
(temporal frame-of-reference); b) children tend to have an internal ranking of their 
competence in different academic domains and to have an upward bias in the subjects they 
are best in and a downward bias in the subjects they are worst in beyond what can be 
explained by objective ability (internal frame-of-reference); and, most importantly, c) 
children base their self-beliefs on their position among their peers (external frame-of-
reference; see Marsh, 2006 for an overview). Given a major driving force in what children 
value (e.g., intrinsic or interest and instrumental or utility value) are areas in which they 
believe they are competent, it is unsurprising to find that the frames-of-reference noted above 
have been found to be in operation for academic values (Guo et al, 2015c; Marsh et al, 2014; 
2015). Of particular relevance to educational policy are external frames-of-reference effects. 
Indeed, there is now considerable evidence that shows that external frames-of-reference are 
heavily dependent on contextual factors (Marsh, 2006) and that their manipulation is heavily 
susceptible to educational policy (Espenshade, Hale, & Chung, 2005; Salchegger, 2015). 
Contextual Factors. The Big-Fish-Little-Pond Effect model (BFLPE; Marsh, 2006; 
see also the frog pond effect: Davis, 1966; Espenshade, Hale, & Chung, 2005, and range-
frequency theory: Murphy & Weinhardt, 2014) suggests that individuals contrast from the 
group they are members of when evaluating their position in external frames-of-reference.1 
To illustrate, imagine two children of average academic ability. One child is selected into a 
high achieving school where they rank among the poorer performing students. The other 
                                                        1 Such a model is not just present in psychology and sociology. Indeed models of relative wage rank within a 
company and its primary role in job satisfaction and well-being have been developed in economics (see Brown 
et al., 2005; Card et al., 2011). 
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child is selected into a poor performing school where they rank among the best performing 
students. The BFLPE hypothesizes that the child in the poorer performing high school will 
have the higher self-concept despite having the same level of academic ability.2 There is 
exceptionally strong support for the BFLPE from a variety of sources for self-concept (Marsh 
et al., 2001), academic values (Marsh, Kuyper, Morin et al., 2014; Marsh, Abduljabbar et al., 
2014; Marsh & Parker, 1984; Marsh, Seaton, et al., 2008; Nagengast & Marsh, 2012; Zell & 
Alicke, 2009), and even aspirations and attainment, though these effects tend to be much 
smaller in size (Davis, 1966; Marsh, 1991). It should be noted that these claims about the 
prevalence of contrast effects over assimilation effects and the role of school stratification in 
increasing the strength of contrast effects run in direct contrast to cultural models. Indeed, 
Akerlof and Kranton (2010, p. 80) note that an increase in choice of schools leads to greater 
‘social gravity’ or pressure on students to assimilate to the dominant values of their school 
and peers. And, similar to reflected glory models in educational psychology, greater 
achievement. However, empirical research juxtaposing such assimilation processes with 
contrast processes suggests that the latter are strong and persistent, while the former are 
weak and ephemeral (Marsh et al., 2000). Importantly, the BFLPE is known to be larger in 
countries with greater ability stratification (Salchegger, 2016). As such, the BFLPE roughly 
corresponds to the 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 ×  𝜇𝜇 identified above.  
Identity Distortion Model Assumptions 
 Building on Marsh (1987) who provided an early information distortion model to 
explain ethnic divides in academic self-concept, we advance the following claims: 
1. Social class is strongly associated with school placement.  
2. As a result, children from disadvantaged backgrounds are disproportionately selected 
into schools with lower average ability. Thus, for children of similar ability, a child                                                         
2 Assimilation and contrast processes are also known in the economics literature as reference-group dependent 
and rank dependent respectively (Brown et al., 2005). 
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from a working class background is more likely to enroll in a school where the 
average ability is lower than a child from a salariat background.  
3. From a BFLPE perspective, the child from the working class background should have 
higher levels of academic self-concept than an equally able child from a salariat 
background.  
4. This relative advantage for working class children should be strongest in countries in 
which an average child’s relative position in the school is most divergent from their 
absolute position in the country.  
5. This divergence will systematically vary by social class, resulting in undermatching 
(attending a poorer performing school than expected based on ability) for working 
class children and overmatching (attending a better performing school than expected 
based on ability) for salariat children. 
6. Social class differences in academic self-beliefs and values (conditioned on 
attainment) are emergent properties of school selection and educational structure 
rather than a reflection of different cultural views, practices, or beliefs among social 
classes. 
It could be argued that any impact of relative ability on self-concept would dissipate over 
time as children glean information about their standing in the wider community (see 
Goldthorpe, 2007). For example, countrywide standardized testing could provide a natural 
correction to the information distortion noted above. However, empirical evidence suggests 
that the BFLPE tends to get larger over the course of schooling rather than smaller (Marsh, 
Abduljabbar et al., 2014). An explanation for the continual strength of relative performance 
despite information on absolute standing is the local dominance effect (Alicke, Zell, & 
Bloom, 2010; Zell & Alicke, 2009). This effect states that children have a strong preference 
for information about their ability that comes from proximate sources, and that the more 
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proximate the source, the stronger the preference. This finding has been supported in 
experimental studies (e.g., Alicke et al., 2009) as well large observational studies (Marsh, 
Kuyper, et al., 2014). The latter is of particular interest as the results showed that children 
had a tendency to form self-concepts on the basis of within school or class position despite 
some evidence suggesting they can accurately assess their absolute position within their 
country. 
Signaling and Inequality 
Social class differences in self-concept favoring working class children do not 
necessarily represent an equalizing force but rather indicate the degree to which children are 
basing their self-beliefs on distorted information (we outline a procedure for quantifying the 
degree of distortion below). However, supporting our claim that this is not conducive to more 
equitable outcomes, the degree of ability stratification is associated with a negative 
relationship between social class and aspirations and attainment and a weaker relationship 
between self-beliefs and task values and these outcomes (see Parker et al., 2016). This is not 
to say that BFLPE type processes are not in operation for aspirations and attainment; 
empirical research suggests they are (e.g., Marsh, 1991). Rather, we suggest that other 
competing forces which are much more closely tied to social class exist to explain gaps in 
attainment. 
Relative risk aversion and differential resourcing, as outlined in the BG model, are 
parsimonious explanations for such social class differences. However, it is not clear if they 
entirely explain significant country-to-country variation in the strength of social class 
differences in these outcomes. Following from Parker et al. (2016), we suggest that the extent 
of signaling in a school system relating directly to the extent of ability stratification explains 
such variation. School placement can send parents, universities, and employers clear signals 
about a student’s underlying ability and suitability for particular educational or occupational 
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pathways, despite what the student themselves might think (see Bedard, 2001; Checchi, 
2006). We further suggest that signaling exerts a unique and powerful influence on 
aspirations and attainment beyond ability, self-beliefs, and values. Signaling can be explicit, 
such as in systems like Germany where children are placed into either university or 
vocational track schools at an early age. Alternatively, signaling can be implicit, such as in 
stratified countries with selective or private education, where a school’s reputation sends 
salient signals to all parties (Jerrim et al., 2015). Bachmann and Park (2009) note that 
countries with strong signaling tend to propagate social disadvantage in both aspirations and 
attainment (see also Chmielewski, Dumont, & Trautwein, 2013; Hanushek & Wößmann, 
2005; Parker et al., 2016).   
It would be expected that signaling would take on considerable importance in 
countries in which parents from wealthy backgrounds have greater ability and inclination to 
choose the school that their child attends. This includes countries in which tracking by 
academic ability is extensive and undertaken at an early age (e.g., Austria and Germany) and, 
to a lesser degree, countries in which implicit ability stratification occurs via decentralization, 
private or privatized schooling, or where high degrees of parental choice exist (e.g., the UK 
and USA). Countries in which there is little stratification by ability should experience little in 
the way of signaling effects (e.g., Finland and Norway). This is not to say that no class 
differences in aspirations would emerge in these countries. Rather, the differences should be 
smaller as they will relate to resource deficits and relative risk aversion processes rather than 
to these factors in addition to signaling effects. Taken together, while negative 𝜓𝜓𝑤𝑤 and 
positive 𝜓𝜓𝑠𝑠, as well as strong 𝜇𝜇, are anticipated to give rise to conditions that benefit working 
class children in terms of academic self-beliefs and values, it is those same conditions that 
will give rise to stronger signaling which benefits salariat children. 
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Social Class Versus Socioeconomic Status 
Before outlining our hypotheses, we wish to make a final note on our use of social 
class rather than socioeconomic status. Socioeconomic status and social class emerge from 
two distinct theoretical traditions (Wohlfarth, 1997). The former is based on the economics 
literature and is concerned primarily with single or linear combinations of continuous 
measures of income, years of education, and/or occupational prestige (e.g., Ganzeboom & 
Treiman, 1996). Social class emerged out of neo-Durkheimian (e.g., Grusky, 2005) or neo-
Marxist theories (e.g., Sørensen, 2000) and hypothesizes qualitatively distinct groups of 
individuals who are relatively homogenous across a range of intersecting domains (rather 
than linear combinations of those domains), including income and education but also culture 
and similarities in access to and constraints on resources (see Goldthorpe, 2007 for a review).  
In this research, we use Goldthorpe’s (2007) social class schema, which has become 
the standard method, particularly in Europe, for exploring the effect of social class on 
educational outcomes and is used consistently in research on educational and occupational 
stratification (Ichou & Vallet, 2011). We do not wish to pit economic and sociological 
traditions against each other in this research, nor do we seek to suggest that social class 
theoretical models are superior to socioeconomic status ones. Rather, primarily for pragmatic 
reasons, we focus on social class in this research in order to situate this study in the broader 
literature and to be consistent with the theories from which we draw.   
Hypotheses 
 We hypothesize that schooling systems with greater ability stratification result in a 
discrepancy between a child’s position within their school (relative position) and their 
position in the country as a whole (absolute position 3). In such systems, systematic social 
class differences in school selection mean that able working class children will tend to end up                                                         3 We use the term absolute here despite the international context due to the country remaining the primary labor 
market for participants, ignoring international labor mobility. 
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in schools in which their relative position will be higher than their absolute position while 
children from salariat backgrounds will tend to have the inverse relationship. The end results 
of this are a) higher self-beliefs and values in children from working class backgrounds 
conditioned on achievement; b) strong signaling effects leading to lower educational 
aspirations for working class children; and c) the balance between these competing forces 
strongly favors signaling and other rational action theory mechanisms. We test this in two 
studies. Study 1 is a comparative study of groups of countries that differ in ability 
stratification. Here we select countries that fall into three main groups based on Bol, 
Witschge, Van de Werfhorst, and Dronkers (2013) index of tracking and intra cluster 
correlations (ICC) of achievement (e.g., Marks, 2006; see Table 3). First, open countries 
(represented by Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) are those with low tracking and low 
ICCs. Second, stratified countries are those with low tracking but high ICCs (represented by 
Australia, Canada, UK, and USA). Finally, Tracking countries are those with both high 
tracking and high ICCs (represented by Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungry, 
Netherlands, and Slovakia). Study 2 utilized longitudinal data from Australia to explore the 
degree to which working class advantages in self-beliefs and values counteract other factors 
in educational and occupational attainment.  
Study 1. Study 1 consists of three main hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 relates to the 
relationship between school selection and degree of stratification within a country. 
Hypothesis 2 relates to social class differences, conditioned on achievement, in academic 
self-concept and values as a function of country differences in ability stratification. 
Hypothesis 3 relates to social class differences in university aspirations as a function of 
country differences in ability stratification; under the assumption that greater stratification 
implies greater signaling potential. These hypotheses as they relate to different sets of 
countries are outlined in Table 1. 
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 Study 2. Study 2 represents a longitudinal extension in a single country (Australia). In 
this study we test the hypothesis that the academic self-beliefs and values advantage for 
working class children does not translate into a meaningful advantage in educational 
attainment (measured by university entry by age 19 and university graduation by age 25). In 
this way Study 2 is an extension of H3 in Study 1 (see Table 1) but with a focus on a single 
counterfactual question: “how much bigger would social class differences in academic 
attainment be if academic self-beliefs or values did not vary according to class”. 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants. To test the relationships identified in the hypotheses, the current 
research used data from the 2003 cycle of the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA). We chose this database because a) its focus is on math, which has been 
shown to be a particularly important domain for assessing long-term educational outcomes 
(e.g., Parker et al., 2012); b) it is the only PISA cycle to assess long-term educational 
outcomes (we focus here on aspirations to attend university) in all countries; and c) it forms 
the first wave for our longitudinal study (Study 2). We select countries in three groups, Open, 
Stratified, and Tracking, based on differences in degree of ability stratification and signaling 
as measured by ICCs and Bol et al.’s (2013) index of tracking (see Table 3). Basic 
demographics are reported in Table 2. 
Sample Design. In each country, a minimum of 150 schools were selected to 
participate with probability proportional to size. Thirty students were then randomly selected 
from within each school. Average response rates of both schools (90%) and pupils (90%) 
were high, though this varied moderately between countries. Further details are available in 
the PISA technical reports (OECD, 2004). The survey organizers provided a set of population 
weights and these were used in all analyses. The two stage sampling procedure of PISA 
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means the data has a complex structure with students nested within schools. The small 
amount of missing data was addressed using five multiple imputations (Enders, 2010). A 
single imputation with each of the plausible values for math achievement (see below) was 
undertaken so that five imputed datasets were retained, each with one of the five plausible 
values for mathematics, reading, and science. Models incorporating weights and multiple 
imputations were estimated using the survey and mitools packages in R (Lumley, 2010). We 
used country specific standardization for all predictors.  
Measures. The measure Children’s university aspirations was based on the PISA 
item that asked “which of the following do you expect to complete” (emphasis in original 
question) in relation to level of education. Country specific options were provided in the 
questionnaire.4 The primary outcome of interest was whether the child selected one of the top 
categories (ISCED level 5a or ISCED level 6), referring to university or postgraduate level 
education. Response rates to this question were very high (over 95% in all the countries we 
considered). Child social class was based on parents’ occupation recoded into the three 
classes (salariat, intermediate, and working) using the Erickson–Goldthorpe–Portocarero 
(EGP) schema (Erikson, Goldthorpe, & Portocarero, 1979). As per Erikson (1984) and 
Morgan, Spiller and Todd (2013), the ‘highest’ (most prestigious) occupation of the child’s 
mother or father is used. Children’s academic achievement was measured via performance on 
a standardized test. The achievement tests used in PISA are specifically designed to enable 
cross-national comparisons. As part of the PISA 2003 study, children (aged 15) sat a two-
hour test. Since the PISA’s major domain in 2003 was math ability, the majority of test 
questions focused on children’s skill in mathematics (our focus here) with a smaller number 
of items testing their ability in reading and science. Answers were summarized by the survey 
organizers into a single score for each of the three domains using an item-response model; the 
intuition of such models is that true skill in each subject is unobserved and must be estimated 
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from the answers to the test (see OECD, 2004 for further details). Five plausible values were 
generated for each pupil, estimating their proficiency in each subject. The survey organizers 
scaled these scores (across all OECD countries) to have a mean of 500 points and standard 
deviation of 100. In all analyses we used math achievement which was z-standardized within 
each country. We ran all analyses for each plausible value separately and combined the 
results using the formulas defined by Rubin (1987). Math self-concept, intrinsic value, and 
utility values were measured using the summary scores provided by the PISA organizers. 
Again these were z-standardized within each country. 
Information Distortion Index. Testing of several of the hypotheses required a means 
of quantifying the degree of mismatch between relative and absolute ability positions. In this 
paper we developed an information distortion index (IDI; see also Murphy & Weinhardt, 
2013 for an example of a similar approach). The IDI is defined as the difference in relative 
percentile rank and absolute percentile rank. Thus, an IDI index of 20 would indicate an 
undermatched student whose relative percentile rank is 20 points higher that their absolute 
percentile rank. A score of -10 would indicate an overmatched student whose relative rank 
was 10 percentile points lower than their absolute rank. Positive scores represent students 
who are undermatched to a school based on their ability, while negative scores indicate 
overmatching. Figure 1 shows the difference between relative (i.e., within school) and 
absolute (i.e., within country) percentile in different countries. 
 An IDI can be calculated for each individual student provided there is representative 
data at both the school- and country-level which can be averaged over sub-groups of 
participants. As a country-level summary statistic, we calculate the median of the absolute 
IDI scores (AIDI)4. This is the 𝐿𝐿−𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁1  of the distance from the 45° line in Figure 1. This 
index is naturally related to the intra cluster correlation (ICC) but is a) more easily                                                         
4 The average of the IDI scores theoretically sums to zero and we therefore take the median of the absolute 
scores. Mean AIDI and IDI scores are reported in supplementary materials but produce very similar results (see 
Table A1). 
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interpretable in relation to distortions of frames-of-reference, b) more flexible as each 
individual gets a unique score and thus AIDI can be easily calculated for different groupings 
and c) more readily interpretable to lay audiences who are familiar with percentile ranks. We 
would expect that the BFLPE should be largest in countries with the biggest AIDIs, as with 
ICCs. Indeed, using the information from Table 1 in Salchegger (2015) this is the case for 
OECD countries (Spearman r = -.631, p < .001).  
Analysis. Models including country fixed effects are used to test hypothesis H2 and 
H3: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 =  �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 +  �𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛−1
𝑘𝑘=1
+ 𝑛𝑛−1
𝑗𝑗=1
 �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗  × �𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛−1
𝑘𝑘=1
 𝑛𝑛−1
𝑗𝑗=1
    (1) 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 +  �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 + 𝑛𝑛−1
𝑗𝑗=1
�𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘 + 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻 ×  �𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛−1
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛−1
𝑘𝑘=1
+ �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗  × �𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛−1
𝑖𝑖=1
 𝑛𝑛−1
𝑗𝑗=1
 (2) 
Here, Y is the outcome of interest (self-beliefs, values, or aspirations), EGP is a series of 
dummy variables representing social class (salariat as the reference category), CNT 
represents a series of dummy variables for country (Australia as the reference category) and 
ACH is the within country standardized math achievement. Equation 1 provides estimates of 
unconditional social class differences, while Equation 2 provides differences conditioned on 
academic achievement. Group averages and differences between groups for the Open, 
Stratified, and Tracking countries were derived using the delta method. 
Due to clustering at the school level, standard errors calculated as if observations are 
all independent, would have been smaller than they should be and, thus, significance tests 
would be more liberal than is appropriate (Stapleton, 2008). To account for this, all models 
were estimated using replicate and population weights provided by the survey organizers 
(Lumley, 2010). This ensured that statistical inference accounted for this additional 
uncertainty. 
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 Link function. In the context of binary outcome models there are issues with the use 
of either probit or logit link functions when comparing coefficients across countries. In 
particular, there are potential dangers in comparing coefficients across groups (as is the focus 
of this research) as any change in parameter estimates could be due to either ‘confounding’ or 
‘rescaling’ (Allison, 1999; Mood, 2010). Linear probability models (LPM; OLS regression 
with binary variables) provide unbiased and consistent estimates of the average effect of each 
variable and thus facilitate group comparison (Mood, 2010). LPMs also have the additional 
advantage of parameter estimates that are directly interpretable (Mood, 2010). Nevertheless, 
results from probit regression models are presented in the Appendix (Table A2); we 
compared countries using differences in predicted probabilities in order to avoid some of 
these concerns noted by Mood (2010).  
 
Results 
Hypothesis 1. Open countries had low tracking, small ICCs and an AIDI of 6. This 
means that the median individual in an Open country had just 6 percentiles difference 
between their rank in their school and in their country. Stratified countries also had low 
tracking but moderate ICCs and a median AIDI of 10. Finally, Tracking countries had high 
tracking, high ICCs, and a median AIDI of 16. This confirmed the selection of countries as 
three distinct groups. Thus, we found clear support for H1a. Table 3 also confirms H1c where 
differences in IDI were largest for Tracking countries and smallest for Open countries. 
Confirming H1b, all social classes had small IDIs in Open countries while in Stratified and 
Tracking countries, children from salariat backgrounds tended to be overmatched (negative 
IDI) and children from working class backgrounds tended to be undermatched (positive IDI). 
Taken together, these findings are consistent with the overarching premise of Hypothesis 1 
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that high stratification is associated with more evidence of meaningful social class 
differences in school selection. 
Hypothesis 2. Table 4 provides results for both unconditional and conditional social 
class differences in math self-beliefs and values. Consistent with both hypothesis H2a and 
H2b, the lower levels of these variables in working and occasionally intermediate class 
children compared to salariat children in the unconditioned models were often reversed in 
Stratified and Tracking countries when conditioned on academic achievement in math. Thus, 
using Australia and self-concept as an example, the difference favoring salariat over working 
class children was .144 of a standard deviation. Upon controlling for achievement, this 
difference flipped, such that working class children were, on average, .137 standard deviation 
units higher than salariat children. However, there were two surprises in the results. First, we 
hypothesized that conditioned social class differences in Open countries should be 
approximately zero and indeed in half of instances this was the case. However, in the other 
half of cases, small though significant decrements in self-beliefs and values were observed 
for working and particularly intermediate class children. This is not consistent with either our 
information distortion model or the BG model. Second, while we hypothesized that Tracking 
countries would, on average, see higher levels of self-beliefs and values in working class 
children than salariat children, we were surprised by the size of this effect. Working class 
children were, on average, higher than .15 of a standard deviation and, for intrinsic value, 
above .20 of a standard deviation.  
Hypothesis 3. Table 5 provides the results for hypothesis 3. Again, using LPMs, we 
tested social class differences both unconditioned and conditioned on academic achievement. 
In all countries social class differences were large and significant, favoring salariat children 
over working and intermediate class children. Further, this pattern of results remained 
significant in all countries after conditioning on achievement. Consistent with Parker et al. 
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(2016), conditioning on achievement resulted in much bigger declines in social class 
differences in Tracking rather than Stratified or Open countries, although social class 
differences remained significantly larger in Tracking countries. Finally, we conditioned on 
achievement, self-beliefs and values. Again, working and intermediate class children had 
significantly lower aspirations for university completion than children from salariat 
backgrounds. Consistent with our information distortion model, controlling for self-beliefs 
and values resulted in small, but not statistically significant, increases in social class 
differences in aspirations in Stratified and Tracking countries, indicating that information 
distortion may slightly attenuate the impact of social class differences on aspirations and 
attainment. This is a hypothesis we directly address in the following study. 
Study 2 
Methods 
Participants. The Longitudinal Study of Australian Youth (LSAY) is a longitudinal 
extension of the PISA 2003 used in Study 1. The initial wave consisted of 10,370 15-year-old 
Australians surveyed over ten years. The sample had approximately equal numbers of 
females (49.7%) and males, and consisted largely of children born to native-born Australians 
(78%), with smaller populations of first (11%) and second (9%) generation Australian 
immigrants. Two percent of the sample identified as being of Aboriginal or Torres Islander 
decent. Using international classifications, 40% of the participants had at least one parent 
with a university level of education and 43% had at least one parent with either short cycle or 
post-secondary non-tertiary level of education. The remaining participants had at least one 
parent with some high school or lower level of education (17%).  
We used the wave collected at age 19 to measure university entry and the wave 
collected at age 25 to measure university graduation. By the age 19, 64% of the original 
sample remained in the study. By age 25, only 37% remained in the sample. Given the 
Information Distortion Model 23 
sample attrition, there is a trade-off between representativeness and time of measurement; 
however, recording university completion at age 25 provided sufficient time for even late 
entrants to have entered university, completed at least a bachelor’s degree, and to have 
generally entered the job market. It should be noted that this level of attrition is of a similar 
magnitude to other large-scale longitudinal studies that cover such a dramatic period of 
change. We used the combined sampling and attrition weights provided by the survey 
organizers to account for attirition. Multiple imputation was used to account for the very 
small amount of remaining missing data, including variable specific missing data (see Study 
1 for details). However, it should be noted that there is possible selection by attrition as 41% 
of the age 19 sample reported attending university and yet 42% of the age 25 sample reported 
having obtained a bachelors degree. Part of this could have been due to late entrants into 
university, which is common in Australia (i.e., after gap-years; see Parker et al., 2015). 
However, after weighting there was no evidence of differential attrition by social class, which 
remained stable between Study 1 (age 15) and the two age periods in Study 2 (age 19 and 
25). 
Measures. The measures of social class, achievement, self-beliefs, and values were 
identical to those used in Study 1. The only difference was that the longitudinal outcomes 
present for Australian participants of the PISA 2003 cycle were used. For university entry, a 
derived variable was used which indicated whether the participant had enrolled in a 
bachelor’s degree at any stage from 2003 to 2007. For university graduation, a derived 
variable was used which summarized information from career interviews from all waves of 
the LSAY database. In this case, a participant was considered a university graduate if at any 
time from 2003 to 2013 they indicated they had completed a bachelor’s degree or higher. 
Further information can be found at http://www.lsay.edu.au/publications/2487.html. 
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Analysis. The analysis approach taken in Study 1 was followed in terms of use of 
replicate weights, multiple imputations for missing data and use of plausible values for 
achievement. Again, linear probability models were used (see Appendix Table A3 for probit 
models). We modeled the hypotheses as: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 + 𝑈𝑈𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 + �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗    (3)𝑛𝑛−1
𝑗𝑗=1
 
Here, Y is university entry or graduation, ACH is math achievement, SB is math self-belief, IV 
is the intrinsic value of math, and UV is the utility value of math of individual, i, evaluated at 
age 15. EGP is a series of dummy variables representing social class. 
Using the difference between salariat and working class children in the probability of 
graduating university as an example, we used the parameter estimates from this model to 
calculate a set of unconditional probabilities (see Parker, Bodkin-Andrews, Marsh, Jerrim, & 
Schoon, 2015 for more information): 
• UCP1. The probability of a working class child completing university based on their 
own achievement, self-beliefs, values and choice profile. 
• UCP2. The probability of a salariat child completing university based on their own 
achievement, self-beliefs, values and choice profile. 
• UCP3. The probability of a working class child completing university based on their 
own self-beliefs, values, and choice profile but the achievement profile of the salariat 
children. 
• UCP4. The probability of a salariat child completing university based on their own 
self-beliefs, values, and choice profile but the achievement profile of working class 
children. 
The total gap in attainment between salariat and working class children is thus the difference 
in probability between UCP1 and UCP2, or:  
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𝐸𝐸(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 |𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑆𝑆) −  𝐸𝐸(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈|𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑊𝑊)  (4) 
UCP1 to UCP4 were then recalculated as conditioned probabilities CP1 to CP4, in which 
only achievement and choice components were calculated at class specific levels and self-
beliefs and values were evaluated at the population means.  
The difference in the unconditional and conditional social class differences in the 
probability of graduating university or obtaining a salariat occupation for these two lots of 
probabilities provided a counterfactual estimate of the degree to which the working class 
advantages in math self-beliefs and values meaningfully reduce the gap in attainment that 
would occur if no such differences were present. A third set of counterfactual probabilities 
are presented in supplementary materials that provide evidence on the rather speculative 
assumption that social class achievement gaps would remain constant if gaps in self-beliefs 
and values were completely erased. Given the results of Study 1, this seems unlikely. Rather, 
it is more likely that declines in social class gaps for self-beliefs and values would be 
accompanied by a reduction in achievement gaps (i.e., the whole system would move to be 
more like a Open country). As such, we provide a counterfactual case where we substitute 
Australian social class achievement differences with Finnish social class achievement 
differences (i.e., a reduction in social class gaps of approximately .15 standard deviation 
units). 
Results 
 Table 6 gives the results of social class differences in university entry (aged 19) and 
university graduation (age 25) based on social class and predictors at age 15. Results 
suggested several conclusions. First, there are considerable social class differences in both 
university graduation and salariat occupational attainment. Second, these differences remain 
significant after holding achievement, self-belief, and value factors constant. This is 
consistent with the BG model that relative risk aversion and resource differences account for 
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a considerable difference in social class attainment gaps. Third, holding self-beliefs and 
values constant across social classes (i.e., removing the effects of the information distortion 
model) barely changed the size of differences. At its largest, the results suggest that if 
academic self-beliefs and values were constant across social classes, differences by social 
class would grow, at most, by half a percentage point. To put this in context, we ran further 
counterfactual models in which achievement differences in Australia were replaced by the 
slightly smaller differences in Finland, under the assumption that a reduction in self-belief 
and value differences by social class would be accompanied by a counteracting reduction in 
academic achievement differences. Rather than an increase in social class differences in 
attainment this relatively conservative counterfactual case resulted in a four-percentage point 
decline in university entry gaps between salariat and working class children and a three-
percentage point decline in gaps between these groups in university graduation. Reduction in 
the gaps between salariat and intermediate class children were much smaller at one-and-a-
half to half a percentage point for university entry and graduation respectively. 
Discussion 
 The current research aimed to test the implications of an information distortion model 
of social class differences in academic self-beliefs and values. In particular, the model 
proposes that children rely primarily on relative rank in their local environment (e.g., school 
or class) when forming self-beliefs and values (see also Murphy & Weinhardt, 2013). The 
information distortion model suggests that a) the degree of ability stratification, and b) the 
degree to which there is a systematic bias in the tendency for working class children to be 
undermatched and salariat children to be overmatched, will result in working class children 
having either equal (as implied by the BG model) or higher academic self-concepts once 
academic achievement is accounted for. The model further proposes that these same 
educational conditions send strong signaling messages, overwhelming the possible benefits 
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from self-beliefs and values, which would result in working class children being significantly 
less likely to aspire to and attain a university level of education. 
Study 1. Results for Study 1 were generally supportive of the information distortion 
model. In particular, there was clear evidence of information distortion (distance between 
relative and absolute percentile rank) and social class differences in overmatching and 
undermatching in Tracking and Stratified countries but not in Open countries. Support was 
also found for the effect of this information distortion on self-beliefs and values. Of particular 
interest was the size of the mathematic self-beliefs and values advantage for working class 
children over their similarly able salariat peers in Tracking countries. Indeed, for 
mathematics self-beliefs and utility values, this difference was as high as one fifth of a 
standard deviation. To place this in context, this is not much smaller than the oft-reported 
gender difference in mathematics self-beliefs in OECD countries (OECD, 2013); a gap that is 
not conditioned on achievement.  
While the support for the majority of hypotheses was clear, there were two 
exceptions. First, we hypothesized that countries with little achievement stratification (i.e., 
Open countries) would have no social class differences in academic self-beliefs and values 
once achievement was accounted for. This was almost universally the case when comparing 
salariat and working class children (notwithstanding a barely significant effect for utility 
value). However, for math self-concepts and utility values, intermediate class children were 
significantly lower than salariat children in some cases. This could be taken as evidence in 
favor of cultural models that implicitly assume an assimilation process (e.g., Akerlof & 
Kranton, 2000). However, it should be noted that these differences were very small: 
approximately a twentieth of a standard deviation. As such, it is hard not to rule out concerns 
over measurement. Further, these differences largely tended to occur between salariat and 
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intermediate class children rather than between salariat and working class children, as might 
be expected by cultural models. 
Such results require further investigation. For example, it may be that both 
assimilation (cultural models) and contrast (information distortion model) processes are in 
operation; with the former significantly weaker under most conditions. However, assimilation 
processes may be more powerful when there is little of either stratification or selection. 
Alternatively, it could be that working class children struggle more with being overmatched 
due to fewer social and financial resources and that this is especially the case in countries 
where under- and overmatching are less tied to social class (i.e., Open countries). Indeed, the 
differential effects of over- and undermatching represent an important line of future research. 
Finally, given the local dominance effect, it is possible that these results may be due to 
treating the school, rather than the more salient classroom, as the context of interest (Marsh et 
al., 2014). Indeed, given that many of the countries identified in this study as non-tracking 
did have some form of within-school and/or subject based tracking, testing the hypotheses of 
the information distortion model at the level of the classroom is another critical area for 
further research. Within-school tracking has increased in prominence and the combination of 
between-school differences in within-school tracking processes has important implications 
for placement by social class (Chmielewski, 2014). This may also have interesting 
implications for the information distortion model. It is worth noting that out-of-school peer 
groups, which may be more or less socially homogenous in different countries, represent a 
largely unknown context in moderating the effects noted here.  
The second unexpected finding was of particular relevance to the signaling 
component of our model. As expected, social class differences in Tracking countries were 
significantly larger than both Stratified and Open countries, regardless of the set of controls 
used. Also consistent with our hypotheses, Stratified countries had significantly larger social 
Information Distortion Model 29 
class gaps in university graduation aspirations than Open countries. However, this difference 
was only statistically significant when achievement was not accounted for. It is important to 
note that a) in all countries, aspirations favored salariat children regardless of the controls 
used, b) consistent with the information distortion model, social class gaps in aspirations in 
Stratified and Tracking countries got slightly larger rather than smaller once mathematics 
self-beliefs and values were accounted for, and c) the pattern of results was consistent with 
the direction hypothesized and significant in the model with no controls. Despite this, the 
non-expected result deserves attention. One potential explanation is that signaling forces in 
Stratified countries tend to be implicit and defuse rather than explicit and clear as they are in 
Tracking countries (Parker et al., 2016). As such, the signaling may become a more powerful 
influence on aspirations later in Stratified countries than Tracking countries. As noted above, 
it is also possible that signaling due to classroom placement rather than school placement 
complicates the results presented here. 
Study 2.  As noted above, when academic self-beliefs and values were accounted for, 
social class gaps in aspirations actually increased in size. Study 2 investigated this issue 
further by asking the question ‘how much bigger would social class gaps in university and 
occupational attainment be if the information distortion model did not hold’. As expected, 
while the effects of information distortion tended to reduce the potential gaps, this reduction 
was extremely small and was dwarfed by the change that would occur in the context of 
compensatory changes to the achievement gap. Such results can be interpreted in light of 
Boudon’s (1974) primary and secondary effect model in which social class gaps are a product 
of academic ability (primary) and factors related to decision making (secondary). Research 
on this model has typically interpreted secondary effects as the residual direct effect of social 
class on attainment once achievement has been controlled for (Morgan, 2012). Our research 
on self-beliefs and values represents an attempt to explore specific, some would contend 
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central (see Maaz et al., 2006), components of secondary effects. In this case, two 
implications for Boudon’s model emerge from our work. First, not all secondary effect 
mechanisms favor more advantaged children. As such, secondary effects are more accurately 
the summation of competing mechanisms, the balance of which determines the degree to 
which secondary effects favor salariat over working class children.  
Second, while primary and secondary processes are seen as independent, it would be 
inaccurate to assume that reducing the overall influence of secondary effects would leave the 
size of primary effects unchanged. Rather, it is likely that some sort of compensatory process 
would be in operation. Indeed, a similar argument has been made in relation to the standard 
model of social mobility. This argument states that there is no guarantee that closing 
education gaps will not result in other non-educational mechanisms coming to the fore and 
thus keeping social mobility constant (Brown, 2013).  Likewise, as we imply in our set of 
counterfactual models in Study 2, there is no guarantee that reducing secondary effects can be 
done in a way that keeps primary effects constant. Countries in our research that had the 
largest gap in self-beliefs and values favoring working class children also tended to have the 
largest gap in achievement favoring salariat children and the largest proportion of the total 
effect of social class on aspirations explained by achievement (based on Parker et al., 2016). 
The implications of our model then are that educational structures which lead to working 
class children having higher self-concept than salariat children tend to be systems which are 
more unequal, favoring salariat children in aspirations and attainment. As such, it is critically 
important that efforts to increase working class children’s self-beliefs and task values aim to 
account for any potentially unintended consequences.  
Implications for Practice and Theory 
 Educational psychology has long suggested that realistic self-concept (i.e., those that 
match a child’s actual position in the academic achievement hierarchy) is best for children 
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(see Covington & Beery, 1976). We suggest a slight modification in relation to educational 
systems. That is, educational systems in which relative position within school represents an 
accurate proxy of absolute position within the country tend to be the most equal. Further, 
factors like academic self-beliefs and values have a rather limited influence on explaining 
social class gaps in attainment. As such, it may be more fruitful to focus attention on other 
mechanisms such as relative risk aversion, academic achievement gaps, and poorer access to 
resources as outlined in the BG model. This is not to say that self-beliefs and values are not in 
and of themselves important predictors of educational outcomes (see Guo et al., 2015; Marsh, 
1991; Parker et al., 2012), but rather that they do not clearly differentiate between social 
classes in the way that many in educational psychology might expect. It is possible that our 
statistical models underestimate the size of these effects due to the use of math-specific 
factors. However, given other research (see Goldthorpe, 2007) showing the strength of 
relative risk aversion, resource differences, achievement gaps, and signaling factors, and our 
findings here on the impact of the structure of the educational system, it is important that 
macro-level factors and student psychology factors are considered together in policy 
discussions. 
 One of the major goals of such educational policy discussion is to ensure that current 
systems provide students with the human capital (e.g., skill, perceptions, attitudes, and 
beliefs) they need to join the labor force and make a contribution to society (Becker, 1994). 
The current research suggests that educational systems that are highly stratified by 
achievement may be inefficient in obtaining this for everyone. Perhaps paradoxically, 
children from privileged backgrounds who are typically channeled into the top end of 
stratified schools systems may be those most directly affected as they come to have lower 
self-concepts than their objective ability suggests they should. Research dating back 50 years, 
has highlighted that young people form their self-beliefs in relation to highly local peer 
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comparisons which can lead individuals in competitive educational institutions to make less 
ambitious career decisions than they might otherwise do (Davis, 1966). Rather than a 
negative, this could be viewed as an equalizing force as children from lower social classes 
tend to get channeled into less competitive schools and thus receive, at least as seen in this 
study, a notable advantage in self-concept and task values. Unfortunately, as our research has 
shown, such students are largely unable to transform this advantage into more ambitious 
aspirations or increase their educational attainment. Parker and colleagues (2016) suggest that 
this is due to the strong signaling that school placement sends students before social 
comparison processes within those schools can take place. Put simply, it can be hypothesized 
that school systems that rely on ability stratification neither benefit the rich nor assist the poor 
and, as indicated in previous research (Parker et al., 2016), tend to suppress the level of 
aspiration and educational achievement present in the country as a whole. 
 A further important point to note is that our argument against cultural models as it 
applies to social class is not that sociocultural influences are unimportant. Rather, we take the 
BG model position than macro-social class structures do not have the normative power that 
would be required for such models to hold (Goldthorpe, 2006). This does not suggest that 
other social grouping do not exert such normative pressure. For example, it may be that 
Grunsky’s (2005) more disaggregated definition of social class at the level of occupational 
grouping holds more normative power. Likewise, gender, race, and rural living, among other 
social groupings, may impart much more normative pressure than macro-social class can. 
Taken together, the information distortion model should only be seen as a macro-model of 
social class. It remains to be seen whether similar processes exist for other social groupings. 
Limitations 
 The primary aim of the current research was to outline an information distortion 
model. In order to access the full implications of this model we used the PISA 2003 database 
Information Distortion Model 33 
in this research. The rationale behind this was that it included a large number of countries 
with quality social class, achievement, self-beliefs and values, and aspiration measures, and 
could be linked with the LSAY2003 database, which allowed us to extend our model to 
predict educational and occupational attainment 10 years later. Notwithstanding its many 
advantages, there are important limitations of the use of this database. First, it is mathematics 
focused, with self-beliefs and values measured specifically in this domain. This is not unusual 
in this sort of research and mathematics is an important domain in explaining long-term 
attainment (Buchmann  & Park, 2009; Hauser, 2010). Nevertheless, self-beliefs are domain 
specific and, as such, further research should consider the information distortion model in 
relation to other academic domains and in relation to global academic domain variables. 
Second, Study 2 relied on strong assumptions in exploring relevant counterfactual questions. 
While this represents a useful first step, taking advantage of natural experiments, such as 
changes in the educational system due to policy change, is critical to evaluating whether the 
assumptions underlying these counterfactuals hold.  
Finally, it is important to note that we chose to group countries in terms of their 
educational system. However, these groups of countries also differed from each other in other 
respects (e.g., geography and culture). The supplementary material provides a table with a 
range of metrics that may be relevant to the issues at hand (Table A4). As may be seen, when 
comparing these metrics to our educational ones, or substantive groupings bring together 
countries that are quite different in other ways, but nevertheless fit our hypotheses. 
Nevertheless, there are many metrics available beyond those we report and thus it may be 
that the results we find here are a function of third variable differences between countries. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1 
Hypotheses in Study 1 
 Hypothesis Open Stratified Tracking 
H1a Average degree of discrepancy between 
relative and absolute positions in a 
country. 
Low Moderate High 
H1b Direction of discrepancy between 
relative and absolute positions in a 
country 
~0: S,I, & W - S 
+W 
S<I<W 
-- S 
++ W 
S<I<W 
H1c Size of discrepancy, within country, 
between relative and absolute positions. 
Small Moderate  Large 
H2a Social Class differences in self-concept 
(the amount by which distorted frame-of-
reference impact self-beliefs) 
~0 W > I >S W >> I >> S 
H2b Social Class Differences in Values (the 
amount by which distorted frame-of-
reference impact values) 
~0 W > I > S W >> I >> S 
H3a Social Class Differences in University 
Aspirations (the degree to which 
signaling leads to larger social class 
differences). 
W < I < S 
 
W << I << S W<<< I<<< S 
H3b H3a conditioned on academic 
achievement. 
W < I < S 
 
W << I << S W<<< I<<< S 
H3c H3b conditioned on achievement, 
academic self-beliefs, and values 
W < I < S 
 
W << I << S W<<< I<<< S 
Notes. S = Salariat background, I = Intermediate class background, W = Working class background. ~0 = 
Approximately zero. + = Positive value (overmatching); - = Negative value (undermatching); > or < = direction 
of difference. The more symbols the stronger the hypothesized relationship. 
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Table 2 
Demographics 
Country 
 
EGP Class Percentage 
Math 
Achievement 
Math  
self-concept 
Math  
Interest Value 
Math  
Utility Value 
University 
Aspirations N Salariat Intermediate Working 
Open  
        
   FIN 5796 .531 .336 .134 544 .011 -.241 .060 .512 
   ISL 3350 .612 .281 .106 515 .032 -.111 .307 .361 
   NOR 4064 .646 .270 .084 495 -.180 -.165 .149 .259 
   SWE 4624 .563 .336 .101 509 .121 .084 .022 .329 
Stratified  
        
   AUS 12,551 .618 .261 .121 524 .128 .008 .224 .624 
   CAN 27,953 .543 .339 .118 532 .171 -.015 .215 .608 
   GBR 9535 .481 .395 .124 508 .105 .003 .123 .321 
   USA 5456 .634 .272 .095 483 .243 .040 .172 .638 
Tracking  
        
   AUT 4597 .405 .426 .169 506 .061 -.283 -.486 .243 
   CZE 6320 .516 .382 .102 516 -.100 -.182 .008 .367 
   DEU 4660 .444 .417 .138 503 .116 .031 -.042 .192 
   HUN 4765 .429 .444 .127 490 -.151 -.208 -.113 .532 
   SVK 7346 .426 .436 .138 498 -.047 .033 -.044 .427 
Notes. Math achievement is scaled such that it has a mean for OECD countries of approximately 500 and a 
standard deviation of approximately 100. The total sample size is 101,017. 
 
Table 3 
Stratification Indexes 
Country 
Stratification Measures  IDI  IDI: Difference 
Bol ICC AIDI(S.E.) S I W SvI SvW 
Open           
    FIN -.870 .05 5.67(.31)  .41(.54) 1.88(.57) 2.63(.70)  -1.47 -2.21 
    ISL -.805 .04 5.24(.12)  .10(.13) 1.96(.30) 3.91(.71)  -1.87 -3.81 
    NOR -1.043 .07 7.05(.41)  1.35(.62) 3.90(.71) 3.34(.78)  -2.54 -1.98 
    SWE -.870 .11 6.64(.33)  1.02(.50) 2.60(.58) 3.39(.87)  -1.59 -2.37 
   Average -.879 .07 6.15  .72(.44) 2.59(.54) 3.32(.77)  -1.86 -2.60 
Stratified           
    AUS -1.043 .21 9.46(.46)  -.81(.60) 4.88(.71) 6.98(.74)  -5.70 -7.79 
    CAN -1.321 .17 8.36(.31)  -2.76(.52) .55(.38) 1.35(.69)  -3.30 -4.11 
    GBR -1.043 .23 10.34(.51)  1.21(.77) 6.61(.67) 8.87(.28)  -5.39 -7.66 
    USA -1.321 .26 9.97(.52)  -1.10(.67) 2.32(.82) 6.01(.34)  -3.42 -7.11 
   Average -1.182 .22 9.53  -.86(.64) 3.59(.64) 5.80(.01)  -4.45 -6.67 
Tracking           
    AUT 1.817 .55 17.76(.65)  -4.68(.51) 7.69(.45) 14.58(.30)  -12.37 -19.27 
    CZE 1.621 .52 16.38(.65)  3.38(.13) 10.74(.01) 14.46(.30)  -7.35 -11.08 
    DEU 1.862 .58 17.26(.60)  -6.31(.27) 6.19(.26) 10.68(.72)  -12.50 -16.98 
    HUN 1.421 .59 15.80(.81)  -8.43(.28) 5.29(.25) 16.45(.82)  -13.73 -24.89 
    SVK 1.621 .43 14.06(.77)  -2.20(.93) 6.36(.93) 14.19(.95)  -8.56 -16.39 
   Average 1.668 .53 16.25  -3.65(.22) 7.25(.18) 14.07(.62)  -10.90 -17.72 
Notes. Bol = The Bol et al. tracking index. ICC = intra cluster correlation. AIDI = average absolute information 
distortion index. IDI = information distortion index. S = salariat background, I = intermediate background, W = 
working class background, v = versus/comparison. Countries represented using ISO 3-letter codes.
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Table 4 
Marginal Differences in Self-beliefs and Values 
Country Difference in self-concept Marginal Difference in 
self-concept 
Difference in Intrinsic 
Motivation 
Marginal Difference in 
Intrinsic Motivation 
Difference in Utility Value Marginal  Difference in 
Utility Value 
SvI SvW SvI SvW SvI SvW SvI SvW SvI SvW SvI SvW 
Open             
    FIN -.260(.022) -.298(.033) -.033(.028) -.005(.037) -.128(.030) -.136(.046) .000(.030) .029(.047) -.179(.020) -.186(.054) -.068(.030) -.043(.050) 
    ISL -.207(.034) -.321(.056) -.063(.034) -.142(.051) -.108(.036) -.219(.063) -.027(.035) -.116(.062) -.064(.039) -.137(.052) -.009(.039) -.067(.054) 
    NOR -.314(.036) -.317(.056) -.057(.033) -.030(.049) -.185(.038) -.131(.059) .000(.039) .076(.056) -.225(.033) -.305(.052) -.085(.035) -.147(.053) 
    SWE -.280(.034) -.224(.054) -.049(.029) .064(.052) -.170(.038) -.025(.052) -.034(.034) .144(.050) -.181(.036) -.103(.052) -.078(.033) .026(.050) 
   Average -.265(.018) -.290(.025) -.051(.015) -.028(.024) -.148(.019) -.128(.029) -.015(.018) .033(.029) -.163(.017) -.183(.027) -.060(.016) -.058(.027) 
Stratified             
    AUS -.096(.035) -.144(.048) .095(.031) .137(.039) -.012(.030) -.024(.041) .076(.028) .106(.040) -.049(.029) -.078(.038) .039(.028) .040(.036) 
    CAN -.119(.025) -.153(.034) .052(.024) .095(.035) -.067(.023) -.040(.043) .026(.023) .095(.047) -.094(.023) -.090(.038) -.004(.023) .039(.040) 
    GBR -.124(.031) -.147(.053) .081(.030) .166(.053) -.015(.033) .086(.060) .065(.034) .209(.063) -.001(.034) .081(.054) .061(.036) .176(.059) 
    USA -.122(.033) -.159(.049) .048(.034) .134(.048) .025(.037) .129(.055) .070(.040) .206(.059) -.033(.035) .048(.046) .031(.037) .157(.050) 
   Average -.115(.014) -.151(.024) .069(.014) .133(.023) -.018(.016) .038(.028) .059(.016) .154(.028) -.042(.015) -.010(.022) .032(.016) .103(.023) 
Tracking             
    AUT -.094(.036) -.013(.050) .060(.036) .197(.051) .063(.037) .186(.048) .121(.040) .267(.052) .200(.040) .274(.051) .190(.041) .261(.053) 
    CZE -.157(.035) -.180(.052) .055(.034) .174(.053) -.041(.039) .042(.064) .063(.040) .214(.066) -.008(.035) .037(.059) .049(.037) .131(.064) 
    DEU -.047(.035) -.055(.035) .135(.036) .253(.054) .015(.037) .081(.060) .104(.038) .232(.062) .050(.032) .076(.052) .071(.034) .112(.058) 
    HUN -.063(.034) -.004(.062) .128(.034) .250(.064) .054(.037) .112(.056) .135(.040) .219(.058) .031(.036) .044(.049) .092(.036) .125(.050) 
    SVK -.167(.037) -.218(.064) .068(.032) .158(.061) .064(.035) .142(.067) .141(.035) .264(.065) .081(.040) .152(.059) .127(.039) .226(.059) 
   Average -.106(.015) -.084(.017) .089(.014) .188(.020) .031(.016) .097(.024) .113(.018) .215(.027) .071(.017) .102(.023) .106(.017) .151(.025) 
Group Comparison a,b a,b,c^ a,b a,b,c a,b,c a,b,c a,b,c a,b,c a,b,c a,b,c a,b,c a,b,c^ 
Notes. S = salariat background, I = intermediate background, W = working class background, v = versus/comparison. Countries represented using ISO 3-letter codes. 
Standard errors in brackets. All estimates in country-specific standard deviation units. a = Open average significantly difference to Stratified average; b = Open average 
significantly difference from Tracking average; c = Stratified average significantly different from the Tracking average. ^ indicates significant only at the p < .10 level. 
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Table 5 
Differences in University Aspirations 
Country Difference in Aspirations Marginal Difference in 
Aspirations1 
Marginal Difference in 
Aspirations2 
SvI SvW SvI SvW SvI SvW 
Open       
    FIN -.141(.013) -.183(.022) -.096(.013) -.125(.021) -.091(.013) -.123(.020) 
    ISL -.137(.019) -.197(.026) -.091(.017) -.140(.025) -.089(.017) -.132(.024) 
    NOR -.189(.014) -.200(.024) -.137(.014) -.142(.023) -.130(.014) -.132(.022) 
    SWE -.200(.016) -.190(.024) -.150(.015) -.128(.023) -.143(.014) -.135(.022) 
   Average -.166(.007) -.192(.011) -.118(.007) -.134(.011) -.113(.007) -.130(.011) 
Stratified       
    AUS -.192(.017) -.256(.023) -.115(.015) -.143(.022) -.120(.015) -.149(.021) 
    CAN -.205(.012) -.230(.020) -.150(.011) -.150(.019) -.151(.011) -.156(.019) 
    GBR -.200(.015) -.248(.024) -.111(.013) -.111(.020) -.113(.013) -.119(.019) 
    USA -.162(.018) -.238(.025) -.101(.019) -.134(.023) -.104(.019) -.144(.024) 
   Average -.190(.008) -.243(.010) -.119(.008) -.134(.009) -.122(.008) -.142(.009) 
Tracking       
    AUT -.222(.019) -.268(.023) -.147(.016) -.166(.021) -.146(.016) -.167(.021) 
    CZE -.263(.013) -.351(.020) -.156(.012) -.173(.021) -.159(.012) -.183(.021) 
    DEU -.194(.015) -.214(.019) -.128(.014) -.103(.018) -.130(.014) -.107(.019) 
    HUN -.338(.018) -.478(.023) -.189(.015) -.281(.019) -.188(.015) -.278(.020) 
    SVK -.291(.015) -.442(.022) -.164(.012) -.238(.022) -.165(.012) -.241(.022) 
   Average -.261(.006) -.320(.009) -.157(.006) -.177(.009) -.158(.006) -.180(.009) 
Group Comparison a,b,c a,b,c b,c b,c b,c b,c 
Notes. S = salariat background, I = intermediate background, W = working class background, v = 
versus/comparison. Countries represented using ISO 3-letter codes. Standard errors in brackets. All 
estimates in country specific standard deviation units. a = Open average significantly difference to 
Stratified average; b = Open average significantly difference from Tracking average; c = Stratified 
average significantly different from the Tracking average. 1Controlling for achievement. 2Controlling 
for achievement, self-beliefs, and values. 
 
 
Table 6 
Standard and Counterfactual Predicted Probability Differences 
 
Standard Case  Counterfactual Case1 
Difference 
 Counterfactual Case2 
Difference 
 
Probability SE  Probability SE Probability SE 
University entry (age 19)         
    SvI -.187 .016  -.185 .016 .002  -.173 .016 -.014 
    SvW -.247 .024  -.243 .024 .004  -.203 .024 -.044 
University graduation (age 25)         
    SvI -.129 .022  -.133 .022 .004  -.124 .022 -.005 
    SvW -.233 .035  -.234 .035 .001  -.198 .035 -.035 
Notes. S = salariat background, I = intermediate background, W = working class background, v = 
versus/comparison. 1Class specific achievement and direct effect by population self-beliefs and values. 
2 Class specific achievement profile from Finland (taken from Study 1), class specific direct effect, and 
population self-beliefs and values. Difference = difference to standard case.  
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Figure 1. Hexbin plot of relative and absolute percentile rank in Iceland (Open), Australia (Stratified) 
and Hungry (Tracking). The size of the hexagon indicates the density of participants in that region. A 
country with no overmatching or undermatching would have all points on the 45° line. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 
Mean (rather than Median) IDI 
Country AIDI(S.E.)  S I W 
Open      
    FIN 7.41(.34)  .08(.66) 1.99(.63) 2.71(.74) 
    ISL 7.45(.09)  .58(.19) 3.11(.32) 5.56(.72) 
    NOR 9.24(.42)  1.63(.82) 4.48(.78) 3.73(.09) 
    SWE 9.11(.40)  .45(.86) 3.04(.69) 4.04(.19) 
   Average 8.30  .68(.63) 3.15(.60) 4.01(.93) 
Stratified      
    AUS 12.05(.52)  -2.07(.70) 5.01(.69) 7.87(.79) 
    CAN 11.36(.35)  -4.25(.61) .20(.51) 1.78(.78) 
    GBR 13.75(.49)  .23(.10) 7.46(.64) 11.30(.15) 
    USA 13.59(.55)  -.75(.83) 4.97(.92) 8.91(.49) 
   Average 12.69  -1.71(.81) 4.41(.69) 7.47(.05) 
Tracking      
    AUT 20.55(.50)  -3.84(.26) 7.80(.92) 14.06(.20) 
    CZE 19.71(.56)  1.23(.06) 10.79(.86) 15.79(.27) 
    DEU 20.82(.46)  -6.19(.05) 6.39(.09) 11.91(.30) 
    HUN 20.08(.61)  -9.40(.15) 7.59(.05) 17.25(.92) 
    SVK 17.60(.72)  -3.96(.02) 6.79(.87) 15.16(.60) 
   Average 19.75  -4.43(.11) 7.87(.96) 14.83(.46) 
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Table A2 
Differences in University Aspirations: Probit Regression 
Country Difference in Aspirations Marginal Difference in 
Aspirations1 
Marginal Difference in 
Aspirations2 
SvI SvW SvI SvW SvI SvW 
Open       
    FIN -.141(.013) -.183(.022) -.099(.013) -.128(.022) -.095(.014) -.129(.022) 
    ISL -.137(.019) -.197(.026) -.101(.019) -.164(.028) -.099(.019) -.158(.029) 
    NOR -.189(.014) -.200(.024) -.154(.016) -.157(.027) -.149(.016) -.151(.028) 
    SWE -.200(.016) -.190(.024) -.161(.016) -.138(.026) -.157(.016) -.148(.024) 
   Average -.166(.007) -.192(.011) -.129(.008) -.147(.013) -.124(.008) -.144(.012) 
Stratified       
    AUS -.192(.017) -.256(.023) -.121(.016) -.146(.024) -.131(.016) -.159(.024) 
    CAN -.205(.012) -.230(.020) -.156(.012) -.154(.020) -.161(.011) -.165(.021) 
    GBR -.200(.015) -.248(.024) -.124(.015) -.137(.024) -.128(.015) -.147(.025) 
    USA -.162(.018) -.238(.025) -.104(.019) -.133(.024) -.108(.020) -.147(.026) 
   Average -.190(.008) -.243(.010) -.126(.009) -.143(.010) -.133(.009) -.156(.011) 
Tracking       
    AUT -.222(.019) -.268(.023) -.167(.017) -.198(.025) -.164(.017) -.198(.025) 
    CZE -.263(.013) -.351(.020) -.186(.016) -.227(.031) -.192(.015) -.239(.031) 
    DEU -.194(.015) -.214(.019) -.140(.015) -.118(.026) -.142(.015) -.121(.026) 
    HUN -.338(.018) -.478(.023) -.203(.017) -.328(.024) -.201(.017) -.325(.025) 
    SVK -.291(.015) -.442(.022) -.189(.014) -.313(.030) -.190(.014) -.317(.031) 
   Average -.261(.006) -.320(.009) -.177(.006) -.237(.013) -.177(.006) -.239(.013) 
Group Comparison a,b,c a,b,c b,c b,c b,c b,c 
Notes. S = salariat background, I = intermediate background, W = working class background, v = 
versus/comparison. Countries represented using ISO 3-letter codes. Standard errors in brackets. All 
estimates in country specific standard deviation units. a = Open average significantly difference to 
Stratified average; b = Open average significantly difference from Tracking average; c = Stratified 
average significantly different from the Tracking average. 1Controlling for achievement. 2Controlling 
for achievement, self-beliefs, and values. 
 
 
Table A3 
Standard and Counterfactual Predicted Probability Differences 
 
Standard Case 
 
Counterfactual Case1 
Difference 
 
Counterfactual Case2 
Difference 
 
Probability SE 
 
Probability SE Probability SE 
University entry (age 19) 
 
  
     
 -.220 .018  -.222 .018 .002  -.209 .019 -.011 
 -.283 .027  -.286 .027 .003  -.245 .030 -.038 
University graduation (age 25) 
 
  
     
    SvI -.143 .024  -.147 .024 .004  -.138 .024 -.005 
    SvW -.256 .036  -.258 .036 .002  -.226 .039 -.030 
Notes. S = salariat background, I = intermediate background, W = working class background, v = 
versus/comparison. 1Class specific achievement and direct effect but population self-beliefs and values. 
2 Class specific achievement profile from Finland (taken from Study 1), class specific direct effect, and 
population self-beliefs and values. Difference = difference to standard case. 
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Table A4 
Country Metrics 
Country 
PISA Math 
Rank 
Educational 
Spending as 
% of GDP 
Social 
Expenditure 
as % of GDP 
Cultural 
Diversity 
Index 
% 
Immigrant 
High-School 
Graduation 
Rate 
Open       
    FIN 2 7.2 23.8 .132 3.0 87 
    ISL 14 9.9 17.2 - 6.8 73 
    NOR 22 8.9 23.7 .098 7.6 82 
    SWE 17 7.6 28.2 .189 12.0 82 
Average 14 8.4 23.2 .140 7.3 81 
Stratified       
    AUS 11 10.1 17.5 .147 23.5 77 
    CAN 7 8.8 16.3 .499 18.1 93 
    GBR - 8.5 19.0 .184 8.6 79 
    USA 28 - 19.2 .271 11.6 90 
Average 15 9.1 18.0 .275 15.4 85 
Tracked       
    AUT 18 6.2 26.5 .100 14.1 83 
    CZE 13 5.8 18.8 .064 4.7 82 
    DEU 19 6.6 26.6 .090 12.9 87 
    HUN 25 5.2 21.9 .185 3.0 83 
    SVK 21 6.1 16.6 .170 3.2 91 
Average 19 6.0 22.1 .122 7.6 85 
Notes. PISA rankings for math for PISA cycle 2003. Cultural diversity index taken from Fearon 
(2003). Social expenditure taken from the 2003 values from the OECD social expenditure database 
(https://www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm). Percent immigrant taken from the OECD foreign-born 
database (https://data.oecd.org/migration/foreign-born-population.htm). Graduation rates taken from 
the OECD better life index which reports percentage of adults aged 25-64 who have completed upper 
secondary education (http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/education/). Educational expenditure 
as percentage of GDP taken from the OECD public spending on education database from the 2005 
values (https://data.oecd.org/eduresource/public-spending-on-education.htm).  
